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7A B S T R A C T
15This exploratory study is based on a statistical data analysis to determine 
whether a long-term correlation is present between South African CEO 
compensation and company performance in the banking sector. The 
detailed analysis, using a seven-year time period, is performed at individual 
company level as well as at sector level and includes two measures of 
company performance, namely market performance (share price) and 
accounting performance (return on equity, EBITDA and HEPS). The 
study is based on the agency theory, which postulates that linking CEO 
compensation to company performance is a means of reducing agency 
monitoring costs. It takes into account the historical and current trends 
in CEO compensation, including King III and its “say-on-pay” provision. 
Six out of seven null hypotheses were accepted in the study, indicating 
a long-term correlation between CEO compensation and variables such 
as company performance, average employee salary, general market 
performance and inflation. No correlation was found with company size.
16Key words:  CEO compensation, company performance, CEO remuneration, corporate 
governance, agency cost, agency theory, King III, banking sector, remuneration 
committee.
Introduction
1It is important for shareholders that sustained market-related returns are generated. 
A key motivational factor in achieving this is chief executive officer (CEO) 
compensation linked to performance. A balance needs to be achieved between long-
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term and short-term compensation while also taking into account the market value 
of any particular CEO’s role.
Politicians, the media and unions have criticised the current CEO pay levels at 
firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) in comparison with average 
employee salaries. Unfortunately, emotionally charged overgeneralisations are often 
not based on facts. An index called the Gini coefficient is calculated periodically and 
determines the level of inequality between high income groups and groups earning a 
basic wage. South Africa consistently ranks among countries with the highest levels 
of inequality (World Bank 2013).
This study contributes to the discussion on excessive CEO compensation and 
the question whether the current levels of compensation are based on merit. CEO 
compensation is scrutinised in the context of growth in the performance of companies 
over a seven-year period.
Objective of the study
1The aim of this study was to determine whether a long-term positive relationship 
exists between CEO compensation and the company’s performance. Company 
performance is divided into: (i) market performance (growth in share price) and 
(ii) accounting performance (headline earnings per share [HEPS] and/or earnings 
before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation [EBITDA] and/or return on 
equity [RoE]).
This study confirms the existence of other plausible relationships by determining 
the relationship between CEO compensation and (i) general employee compensation 
(CEO pay multiple and/or average employee salary), (ii) company size (total assets 
and/or number of employees), (iii) its peers (the JSE Banking [JSE Banks] Index; 
CEO compensation), (iv) the general market performance (JSE All Share Index 
[ALSI]) and (v) the general inflation (Consumer Price Index [CPI] inflation).
In the United States of America (USA), substantial data are available on CEO 
compensation as a multiple of average employee wage, yet very few similar studies 
have been performed in South Africa. Given the local complexities of inequality, 
poverty and unemployment (underpinned by the Gini coefficient), this study provides 
data that will serve as a reference point for future decisions.
The result of this study informs future discussions on the effectiveness of 
disproportionate CEO compensation packages and their long-term correlation 
with increased market capitalisation and sustained accounting performance. In 
addition, the study provides a scientific means of determining whether statements by 
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boards of directors about the correlation between company performance and CEO 
compensation are valid.
Theoretical foundation and literature review
1Figure 1 outlines the structure of the literature review and gives an overview of the 
sequence and order of the theoretical topics covered.
The agency theory establishes the link between company performance and 
executive compensation. The agency theory is the theoretical foundation for executive 
compensation and its level (the absolute value) and composition (the structure).
1
Figure 1: Overview of the fundamental bases covered by the study
Executive compensation – what performance measure to use?
1It is necessary to determine which indicators of company performance should be 
used to evaluate performance. The indicators could be market-based or based on 
“historical” accounting profit (Eriksson & Lausten 2000).
Market performance
1A company’s market capitalisation is the number of issued shares multiplied by 
the quoted share price on the securities exchange (SE). Owing to the influence 
of external factors, it does not always make sense to use the market information 
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unless the shortcomings are mitigated. This could be achieved by expanding the 
time horizon of the study and performing relative performance evaluations.
In order to determine a general trend, thereby removing short-term speculation 
and emotive effects such as herding and contagion (Paulo 2011), a long-term view 
of the market price needs to be developed. This will also remove the influence of 
macroeconomic factors such as the recent global economic recession. If viewed over a 
five- to seven-year period, the SE is less erratic. Consequently, a period of seven years 
was selected for this study to represent its long-term perspective.
Another method of increasing the utility of market information is to determine the 
company’s performance relative to its peers. Tyson and Bournois (2005) and Farmer, 
Archbold and Alexandrou (2013) refer to this as “relative performance reviews”. Causes 
of relative performance include increasing market share or increasing profitability at 
better rates than those of the competitors. Comparing the performance of a company 
to that of its competitors enables the researcher to determine the relative performance 
of the company irrespective of external factors.
Accounting performance
1Given that publicly traded companies are subject to stringent regulatory oversight, 
using data from these companies does contribute to integrity and reliability. However, 
accounting data do have inherent limitations: they are historic and therefore 
backward looking, which is no guarantee of future performance; management may 
become focused purely on short-term earnings management (Dechow & Sloan 1991, 
in Murphy 1999); accounting profits can be manipulated by adjusting discretionary 
amounts (Healy 1985, in Murphy 1999); and temporary disequilibrium effects 
may be present, including different tax laws (for multinationals) (Wernerfelt & 
Montgomery 1988).
Despite the limitations, accounting profits are still widely accepted and used for 
performance measurement, but the types of metrics used have changed over the 
years. More traditional metrics are included in this study, namely return on equity 
(RoE); earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA); 
and headline earnings per share (HEPS). Metrics that have evolved and now take 
into account the excess value created by management after deducting the expected 
return are economic value added (EVA). However, when EVA is used it is not always 
easy to compare a company with its peers given the differences in the cost of capital 
expectations of the various companies. EVA was therefore not included as a proxy for 
company accounting performance.
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Determining the composition of CEOs’ variable compensation
1A study by Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) found that the composition of executive 
compensation changed significantly between 1995 and 2005, with equity 
compensation as a percentage of total compensation increasing from 33% to 55%. 
Figure 2 analyses the various components of a typical executive compensation 
package.
1
Figure 2:  Composition of typical CEO compensation package: structure (composition) and level
Historical composition and increasing multiples: a valid concern
1Retaining the services of an experienced professional manager (the agent) requires 
a guaranteed base salary. However, the remainder of the composition of the package 
is open to abuse.
Historical data on CEO compensation multiples indicate that CEO compensation 
has significantly outpaced other employees’ earnings growth. In 2012, the CEOs 
of companies in the JSE Top 40 index received an average increase of 23%. Their 
short-term incentives increased by more than 52%, while the National Union of 
Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) struggled to obtain a 13% increase in the 
minimum wages of miners (Oberholzer & Theunissen 2012).
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According to Paulo (2011), CEOs in the USA were paid 20 times more than the 
average employee 25 years ago, but in 2011 this multiple exceeded 60. As illustrated in 
Figure 3, the multiple for wages earned by the lowest paid employee was approximately 
140 in 1991, but this had skyrocketed to more than 500 in 2003 (Bebchuk & Fried 
2003).
1
Source: Economic Policy Institute (2006)
Figure 3:  CEO compensation compared with minimum wage in the USA (1965–2005)
1In 2008, the South African CEO’s package was 58 times more than the average 
wage of company employees (Duncan 2008). South Africa is a country with growing 
inequality: its Gini coefficient was measured at 0.66 in 1993 and had deteriorated 
to 0.70 in 2008 (Leibbrandt, Woolard, Finn & Argent 2010). This is indicative of a 
growing elite along with lower-level wages that do not match the growth rates of 
higher-level workers (Ramcharan 2010). The CEO pay multiple is an important 
factor in understanding the plight of the average employee relative to CEOs, 
especially when disproportionate bonuses are awarded.
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Recent trends in compensation: encouraging signs
1Important recent trends in executive compensation are the result of the global 
economic recession and an increased focus on corporate governance in the business 
environment over the past decade. Key notable trends are the deferment and/or 
foregoing of bonuses; comparison to peers potentially leading to increased salaries; 
a reduction in base salary and “say-on-pay”; and King III and its effect on CEO 
compensation.
A recent phenomenon is that certain CEOs willingly relinquish their bonuses 
when their companies perform poorly. In 2012, Investec’s CEO, Stephen Koseff, had 
his compensation cut by 87% while also asking not to be considered for a bonus 
(Bloomberg 2012). In the 2012 financial year, ABSA’s CEO, Maria Ramos, deferred 
her R14 million incentive bonus. She would receive the bonus in shares in three equal 
portions in the next three years (Business Day 2012). In their study, Core, Guay and 
Verrecchia (2003) conclude that equity incentives are an efficient means to reduce 
cash outflow.
A study by Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004) found that compensation 
committees rarely do market studies and in many instances appoint consultants to 
recommend suitable compensation levels. The members of the committee, albeit 
qualified, may not have the required information at hand to set compensation at 
the correct levels. The fundamental issue at stake is that compensation levels are not 
set by the shareholders, but rather by directors who have a vested interest, as peers, 
in the recommended compensation package. This leads to excessive compensation 
packages, resulting in increased agency costs.
Increased shareholder activism, such as the appointment of a new CEO, is 
increasingly evident. BHP Billiton’s new CEO, Andrew Mackenzie, was appointed 
in 2013 and offered a base salary that was 20% less than his predecessor’s (Moneyweb 
2013).
All over the world, countries are in the process of approving legislation that will 
allow shareholders to participate in decision-making about executive pay. In the USA 
and Germany, the “say-on-pay” proposal provides for an advisory, non-binding vote 
by shareholders. Australia has approved a “two-strike policy”, whereby all directors 
have to step down (but may be re-elected) if more than 25% of the shareholders 
vote against compensation packages at two consecutive shareholder meetings. In 
Switzerland, shareholders must elect all members of the compensation committee.
In South Africa, following the global emphasis on improved corporate governance, 
the King III Code of Corporate Governance was issued in 2009. King III focuses 
on stakeholder involvement and includes a section on executive compensation (IoD 
2009). The code requires compensation committees to set and disclose the basis 
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upon which executives will be incentivised. Basic salaries and performance-related 
pay should be disclosed separately. It will become increasingly difficult for directors 
to reward themselves if their performance does not form the basis of bonus awards 
(IoD 2009).
The trends give insight into the structuring and justification provided by 
remuneration committees (REMCOs) when determining CEO compensation 
packages.
Frequently cited moderating variables as justification for compensation 
packages
1General executive compensation averages are often the benchmark used by 
REMCOs, but various other factors may moderate the packages awarded to 
CEOs. A study by Oberholzer and Theunissen (2012) found that factors such as 
industry type, industry growth phase, company size and complexity, CEO tenure 
and CEO experience may all play a role in determining the packages offered to 
individuals. Ultimately, shareholders need the services of a professional manager 
to ensure that their interests are managed appropriately. This may contribute to the 
seemingly disproportionate packages offered to certain CEOs. In such instances, 
provided the compensation is adequately structured and linked to performance, it 
is worth retaining the service of such individuals. However, how clear is the link to 
performance?
A critical review of similar research studies
1In an annual publication on executive compensation compiled by PwC (2012), 
key local and international trends are identified and analysed. Contributors to the 
publication suggest that there is still a strong perception that there is a direct link 
between company performance and CEOs’ compensation, which gives rise to ethical 
and monetary challenges. The following critical review of similar studies aims to 
identify areas of focus and to solve problems that result from shortfalls identified in 
the studies.
Link between company performance and CEO compensation
1A study of corporate financial performance and CEO compensation by Firth, Lohne, 
Ropstad and Sjo (1996) in Norway found no significant relationship between 
company performance and CEO compensation. A study by Bebchuk and Grinstein 
(2005) in the USA concluded that, between 1993 and 2003, less than 50% of growth 
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in mean CEO compensation could be linked to company market capitalisation 
growth. A study of the performance of Australian banks and CEO compensation by 
Doucouliagos, Haman and Askary (2007) found a positive correlation between the 
two factors. The study reviews previous findings by Dogan and Smith (2002), which 
found no such correlation in companies listed on the Malaysian Stock Exchange. 
It also notes a positive correlation found by Crespi-Cladera and Gispert (2003) in 
companies listed on the Spanish Stock Exchange. In a study of 200 firms listed on 
the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), conducted by Niap, Taylor, Morley and Kim 
(2012), it was concluded that size is a determinant of CEO compensation, while 
company performance has a very weak correlation. In their dual study of CEO 
compensation and company performance in the United Kingdom (UK) and Poland, 
Herdan and Szczepańska (2012) conclude that there is a positive relationship 
between CEO compensation and both company performance and company size. 
This finding is supported by a Canadian study of 755 firms, conducted by Zhou 
(1999), which found a positive relationship between company size and CEO 
compensation. Their study included a reference to Hansell, Luther, Planschke and 
Schatt (2009), who found a negative correlation between CEO compensation and 
company performance in 158 large US companies during the 2007–2008 period. 
This was during the economic recession and pointed towards excessive levels of 
compensation.
A UK study of the relationship between CEO compensation and company 
performance determined that non-financial measures could be included successfully 
in certain circumstances to compensate CEOs. The study used both financial and 
non-financial measures, such as customer satisfaction (Ogden & Watson 2007). 
A South African study by Loubser (2009) found a statistically significant relationship 
between share-based payments and company market capitalisation. The study 
focused on the assumption that share-based payments are used as a means of reducing 
agency costs, but the study did not take into account overall compensation, nor have 
other moderating variables been tested for a relationship.
A UK study by Farmer et al. (2013) concluded that there is a significant correlation 
between each of the individual elements of CEO compensation (guaranteed pay, 
bonus payments and long-term incentives), while emphasising relative performance 
reviews (e.g. to peers or the industry). The study, performed on the 204 largest non-
financial firms included in the FTSE 350, covered the period from 2003 to 2007. 
However, the study did not include the effect of the global economic recession or 
more recent executive compensation trends.
Given the recent re-pricing of certain CEOs’ basic packages, it is important 
to consider total compensation to determine the relationship between CEO 
compensation and company market value. Other variables typically also need to be 
included in the study to contextualise the findings.
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Determining the best measure for company performance and its link to 
CEO compensation
1In Doucouliagos et al. (2007), a detailed review of the different measures of company 
performance is discussed. This study, while opting for a smaller research sample, 
pursues a detailed understanding of the industry and its driving forces in the context 
of individual firms within the industry. The lack of a detailed industry analysis has 
been an oversight in many similar studies that have only included high-level data 
analyses.
CEO pay multiple
1A noteworthy finding of the Scandinavian study by Firth et al. (1996) is the limited 
variability in remuneration among different levels of salaried employees and the 
CEO. A minimum wage multiple of only 4 has been calculated by Eriksen and 
Lommerud (1992), which is in stark contrast with the USA, where such multiples 
exceed 140 (Bebchuck & Fried 2003).
Ogden and Watson (2007) found that when adequate political and/or regulatory 
pressure is applied to state-owned entities, it results in curtailed increases in CEO 
compensation. In the UK, CEOs operating in the water utility industry have been 
found to be compensated at levels well below the average listed company CEO, 
mostly as the result of regulatory and political pressure.
The inclusion of the CEO pay multiple is particularly important when conclusions 
are reached about excessive CEO compensation in the South African context, as 
the country remains challenged by vast inequalities and a high Gini coefficient 
(Leibbrandt et al. 2010).
Moderating variables identified and linked to CEO compensation in pre-
vious studies
1The study by Firth et al. (1996) established a positive relationship between CEO 
compensation and company minimum wage, while company size was also positively 
linked. Two reasons are given for the link between company size and CEO salary: 
large firms have several executive levels, resulting in a higher overall package; and 
the absolute value of a high CEO compensation is less visible in larger firms.
The study by Herdan and Szczepańska (2012) of Polish and UK firms where a 
correlation between CEO compensation and company size is present, is based on a 
seminal study by Rosen (1982). This study found that large firms prefer CEOs with 
good track records and are therefore more willing to remunerate them at higher levels. 
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Therefore company size is deemed an important variable often cited by REMCOs as 
a reason for above-average CEO compensation packages.
In Niap et al. (2012), a significant positive relationship is reported between 
CEO compensation and the independence of the REMCO, which is ascribed to 
acquiescence. King III gives specific guidelines on the independence of the board 
subcommittees to reduce the likelihood of a friendly REMCO. Doucouliagos et al. 
(2007) proposes that CEO age can be used as a proxy for productivity, with experience 
being mooted as the reason. Other control factors also measured in the study relate to 
company size and CEO share ownership.
Ogden and Watson (2007) report that although non-financial measures in many 
instances could counter the profit focus, the needs of various stakeholders (i.e. a profit 
requirement) could be balanced with adequate planning and a structured approach 
to offset the possible loss of income. However, an objective perspective of performance 
for non-financial measures presents REMCOs with practical challenges.
Doucouliagos et al. (2007) postulate that the recent trend of deferred compensation 
may cause a lagged link between CEO compensation and company performance. 
Niap et al. (2012) investigate both a lagged and a non-lagged relationship between 
CEO compensation and market value, which enables the research team to conclude 
whether compensation drives performance or vice versa.
In this study, no offsets have been included in the data analysis. Given the seven-
year timeline, any correlation would still be identified, since the long-term trend 
would take this into account.
The importance of the time horizon of the study
1Firth et al. (1996) use a time horizon of eight years (1986–1994), but their study 
pre-dates the detailed disclosure of CEO compensation by listed firms. Similarly, 
Doucouliagos et al. (2007) use a 13-year time horizon (1992–2005), but in South 
Africa detailed disclosure has only occurred since the release of King II and IFRS 
2 (both issued during 2002). The ten-year time horizon used by Bebchuk and 
Grinstein (2005) allows for a solid theoretical foundation of data interrelationships.
Loubser (2009) uses a five-year study period, which could be extended to seven 
years to provide a long-term view. The study by Herdan and Szczepańska (2012) is 
based on a time horizon of four years (2007–2010). The time horizon of four years is 
considered too short for a statistical long-term correlation analysis. The Niap et al. 
(2012) study spans only three years (2007–2009) and coincides with the economic 
recession. The latter may have skewed research findings somewhat, particularly 
given such a short time horizon, thereby hampering the ability to reach conclusions 
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on statistical relationships. In Farmer et al. (2013), the study period spans five years 
(2003–2007), which allows for a sound basis. However, had the study extended over 
seven years, it would have included the results of the economic recession and would 
have increased the credibility of the findings.
Previous studies either do not include details of the full compensation package, or 
their assessment timeframes do not extend over a period that allows for meaningful 
statistical analysis and interpretation (subsequent to the amended disclosure 
requirements). This study addresses these shortcomings and incorporates additional 
suggestions, thereby contributing to the field and providing a unique perspective in 
a South African context.
Research question and hypothesis
1The aim of the study was to determine whether a positive long-term relationship 
is present between South African CEO compensation and company performance 
in the banking sector. Do comparatively large CEO packages result in long-term 
wealth creation for shareholders?
H1  There is a positive long-term relationship between CEO compensation and 
company performance. Proxies for performance are as follows:
      (i) Accounting performance: HEPS and/or RoE and/or EBITDA
    (ii) Market performance: share price.
1The study also included moderating variables (included as subhypotheses) relating 
to the various relationships, namely: There is a positive long-term relationship 
between CEO compensation and the following:
(i) Average employee salaries (CEO pay multiple and/or average employee 
salaries)
(ii) Company size (total assets and/or number of employees)
(iii) The company’s peers (JSE Banking Sector CEO compensation)
(iv) JSE market performance (JSE ALSI)
(v) General inflation (CPI inflation).
Research methodology
1Compensation by its very nature is qualitative, yet linking this to performance 
requires both a qualitative and quantitative analysis. REMCOs, in their annual 
reports, maintain that there is a link between company performance and CEO 
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compensation, yet the same reports may emphasise the importance of recruiting 
and maintaining the best talent. A quantitative and qualitative multistep approach 
is utilised given the significant weighting that performance-based incentives carry 
as a proportion of overall CEO compensation. Certain contextual information that 
encompasses an element of qualitative research has also been included, allowing for 
an informed conclusion from the study’s findings.
Sampling
1The firms listed under the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) Banking Sector (a 
grouping used by McGregor BFA for index purposes) formed the starting point for 
selecting all potential firms that could be included in the study. Only companies 
that could show a seven-year financial history were considered for inclusion. All the 
banks included under the JSE Banking Sector (JSE Banks) met this criterion and 
were included.
Data collection and preparation
1Information on CEO compensation was collected manually from the selected 
companies’ annual financial statements by reviewing their remuneration reports. 
All other financial information for the selected companies was obtained, including 
EBITDA, HEPS, RoE, total company salary and wages, total number of employees, 
and the closing share price as at 31 December of each year.
The following values were calculated using the data obtained:
(i) Average employee salary, calculated as follows:
=
 Total company salary and wages
 Total number of employees
(ii) CEO pay multiple, calculated as follows:
=
  Total CEO compensation
 Average employee salary
1Indexed values were calculated for each of the following: CEO compensation, 
average employee salary, company closing share price as at 31 December of each 
period, RoE, EBITDA, HEPS, CEO pay multiple, annual CPI inflation (‘CPI’) 
and JSE ALSI.
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Data analysis methodology
1A decision-tree approach was conceived, as illustrated in Figure 4, to allow for a 
conclusive analysis of and the drawing of conclusions from the results of the research 
study.
1
Figure 4: Multi-step decision tree
1The process illustrated in Figure 4 is explained as follows:
Step 1: Correlation analysis
1The SPSS statistical program was used to perform a correlation analysis of CEO 
compensation and each of the independent variables. It measures the extent to 
which a correlation present in one variable is represented by a variance in another 
variable. For the purposes of this study, correlations that were significant at the five 
per cent level were accepted.
Although the correlation analysis provided a good first impression of the 
relationship between CEO compensation and the variables, further investigation of 
the correlation was deemed necessary. As there was a significant correlation between 
CEO compensation and company performance, the analysis proceeded to step 2.
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Step 2(a): Graphical review of indexed growth values
1The growth for each variable was calculated using an indexed approach. During 
step 2(a), the two indexed variables were graphically plotted to determine whether 
a reasonable correlation was present. Given that further analysis of abnormal values 
was required, the remuneration reports were reviewed for further understanding. 
Other variables were not considered in detail, since the main hypothesis had been 
rejected.
(If, during the graphical review, a significant correlation between CEO 
compensation and company performance had not been present, the process would 
have proceeded to step 3.)
Step 2(a) to (c): Graphical review and review of REMCO reports
1In instances where no significant correlation was found between CEO compensation 
and company performance variables, the following process was followed:
(a) Graphical illustration of the relationship was performed to determine the scope 
of the deviant correlation.
(b) Other variables were considered for significant correlations, while also being 
plotted graphically.
(c) The remuneration reports were reviewed in detail for an explanation of the 
absence of a link between company performance and CEO compensation. The 
justification of CEO compensation was of critical importance to shareholders 
and therefore was expected to appear in the REMCO report for the purposes of 
corporate governance.
Step 3: Conclusion and accepting or rejecting the hypothesis
1The multistep approach has been designed to provide a multilayered approach to 
reaching conclusions on the equitability of CEO compensation relative to company 
performance. Step 1 determined the detailed level of review. However, if step 2 had 
indicated that a detailed analysis of the positive relationship was also required, it 
might have resulted in a different overall conclusion than step 1; this would have 
depended on the outcome of the analysis and conclusion in step 2.
(Step 3 involves an overall review of available information to determine whether 
sufficient reasoning – particularly in instances where no statistical correlation is 
present – is deemed to override the purely quantitative analysis.)
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To determine the existence of an overall relationship between variables, the 
individual company relationships as well as the JSE Banking Sector’s overall 
relationship was taken into account and investigated. Where a majority of companies 
confirmed the existence of a relationship, and where this was supported by the sector 
data, the overall correlation was inferred with confidence. Other cases will require 
the analysis of qualitative data and conclusions based on individual merit.
Other data considerations
1Consideration was given to certain variables affecting the data during the analysis 
and interpretation phase of the study.
Endogenous factors
1These factors include the intricacies of individual companies, such as CEO tenure, 
and major structural changes in company composition, such as unbundling and 
mergers.
Exogenous factors
1These factors include changes in global economic conditions that affect businesses 
globally, and changes in global regulatory requirements for banks, such as the 
changes introduced in Basel III.
Data analysis and discussion of research findings
Part A: Determination of the correlation between CEO compensation 
and company performance at a company level
Barclays Group Africa (BGA)
1In Table 1, no significant correlation at the five per cent level is present between 
the CEO salary and any company performance measures. Furthermore, there is no 
link between the CEO salary and other variables such as total assets and average 
employee salary. External measures such as CPI and JSE Bank Sector salary are 
also not correlated.
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mmdli1 mmdlii.67 mmdliii.22 mmdliv.12 mmdlv-.23 mmdlvi-.63 mmdlvii.24 mmdlviii.12 mmdlix.66 mmdlx.66 mmdlxi.34 mmdlxii.25
mmdlxiiiSig
mmdlxiv(1-tailed)
mmdlxv.05 mmdlxvi.32 mmdlxvii.40 mmdlxviii.31 mmdlxix.07 mmdlxx.30 mmdlxxi.40 mmdlxxii.05 mmdlxxiii.05 mmdlxxiv.23 mmdlxxv.30
mmdlxxviN mmdlxxvii7 mmdlxxviii7 mmdlxxix7 mmdlxxx7 mmdlxxxi7 mmdlxxxii7 mmdlxxxiii7 mmdlxxxiv7 mmdlxxxv7 mmdlxxxvi7 mmdlxxxvii7 mmdlxxxviii7
mmdlxxxix* Significant at 0.05 level.
1Source: McGregor BFA
1In Table 1, no significant correlation at the five per cent level is present between 
the CEO salary and any company performance measures. Furthermore, there is no 
link between the CEO salary and other variables such as total assets and average 
employee salary. External measures such as CPI and JSE Bank Sector salary are 
also not correlated.
In the remuneration committee (REMCO) report, performance measures such 
as return on equity (RoE) are provided as performance benchmarks for CEO 
compensation. A change of CEO midway through the reporting period resulted in the 
re-pricing of CEO compensation. A detailed review of the annual REMCO reports 
reveals that BGA implemented a key executive retention plan. The reasoning for 
the bonuses relates to medium- to long-term strategic integration of all the Barclays’ 
African entities into one group, ABSA (2010). This transaction, realised during 2012, 
provides some justification for the annual bonuses. The CEO’s decision to forego 
her bonus during 2012 is commendable. However, given an insufficient quantitative 
or qualitative link with company performance, the disproportionately large bonuses 
awarded to the CEO, in absolute Rand-value terms, taking the cost per employee and 
CEO pay multiple into account, remains open to dispute.
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Capitec (CPT)


















































































































mmdciv1 mmdcv.81* mmdcvi.77* mmdcvii.72* mmdcviii.73* mmdcix.18 mmdcx.74* mmdcxi.66 mmdcxii.72* mmdcxiii.60 mmdcxiv.56 mmdcxv.66
mmdcxviSig
mmdcxvii(1-tailed)
mmdcxviii.01 mmdcxix.02 mmdcxx.03 mmdcxxi.03 mmdcxxii.35 mmdcxxiii.03 mmdcxxiv.06 mmdcxxv.03 mmdcxxvi.08 mmdcxxvii.10 mmdcxxviii.06
mmdcxxixN mmdcxxx7 mmdcxxxi7 mmdcxxxii7 mmdcxxxiii7 mmdcxxxiv7 mmdcxxxv7 mmdcxxxvi7 mmdcxxxvii7 mmdcxxxviii7 mmdcxxxix7 mmdcxl7 mmdcxli7
mmdcxlii* Significant at 0.05 level.
Source: McGregor BFA
1In Table 2, a significant correlation at the five per cent level is present between the 
CEO salary, the company accounting performance measures (HEPS and EBITDA) 
and the company market performance measure. Notably, CPT also exhibits a 
significant correlation between CEO compensation and total assets, and average 
salary per employee.
CPT has experienced substantial growth coupled with strong accounting 
performance. Although the CEO compensation is closely linked to the JSE Banking 
Sector’s CEO packages in terms of growth, none of the other CEOs’ performance 
nor the absolute value of packages could be compared to that of CPT’s CEO. 
Overall, CPT has been conservative in increasing its CEO’s compensation relative to 






















































































































mmdclvii1 mmdclviii.92** mmdclix.72* mmdclx.83* mmdclxi.04 mmdclxii-.04 mmdclxiii.02 mmdclxiv-.78* mmdclxv.88** mmdclxvi.46 mmdclxvii.64 mmdclxviii.85**
mmdclxixSig
mmdclxx(1-tailed)
mmdclxxi.00** mmdclxxii.03* mmdclxxiii.01* mmdclxxiv.47 mmdclxxv.46 mmdclxxvi.49 mmdclxxvii.02* mmdclxxviii.01** mmdclxxix.15 mmdclxxx.06 mmdclxxxi.01**
mmdclxxxiiN mmdclxxxiii7 mmdclxxxiv7** mmdclxxxv7* mmdclxxxvi7* mmdclxxxvii7 mmdclxxxviii7 mmdclxxxix7 mmdcxc7* mmdcxci7** mmdcxcii7 mmdcxciii7 mmdcxciv7**
mmdcxcv** Significant at 0.01 level.
mmdcxcvi * Significant at 0.05 level.
Source: McGregor BFA
1In Table 3, a significant correlation at the five per cent level is present between CEO 
compensation, one of the company accounting performance measures (HEPS) and 
the company market performance measure. A change of CEO occurred during 2009, 
which coincided with the global economic recession and a reduction in company 
share price. During the period under review, FSR unbundled Discovery (2008), 
Momentum (2011) and Outsurance (2011). However, it has sustained growth and 
closely aligned CEO compensation with company performance.
In Table 4, no significant positive correlation at the five per cent level is present 
between the CEO compensation and company accounting performance measures. 
However, a significant negative correlation is present between CEO compensation 
and RoE, which indicates that the two items moved in an opposite direction. A 
significant positive correlation is present between CEO compensation and variables 
such as the CEO pay multiple, the number of employees, total assets, CPI inflation, 
the JSE ALSI and the average salary per employee.
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Nedbank (NED)



















































































































mmdccxi1 mmdccxii.89** mmdccxiii.79* mmdccxiv.43 mmdccxv-.12 mmdccxvi-.86** mmdccxvii.87** mmdccxviii.76* mmdccxix.99** mmdccxx.99** mmdccxxi.91** mmdccxxii.89**
mmdccxxiiiSig
mmdccxxiv(1-tailed)
mmdccxxv.00** mmdccxxvi.02* mmdccxxvii.17 mmdccxxviii.40 mmdccxxix.01** mmdccxxx.01** mmdccxxxi.02* mmdccxxxii.00** mmdccxxxiii.00** mmdccxxxiv.00** mmdccxxxv.00**
mmdccxxxviN mmdccxxxvii7 mmdccxxxviii7** mmdccxxxix7* mmdccxl7 mmdccxli7 mmdccxlii7** mmdccxliii7** mmdccxliv7* mmdccxlv7** mmdccxlvi7** mmdccxlvii7** mmdccxlviii7**
mmdccxlix** Significant at 0.01 level.
mmdccl * Significant at 0.05 level.
Source: McGregor BFA
1Given the lack of compelling support for the growth in CEO compensation, a 
detailed analysis of the remuneration reports for NED is included in Table 5, which 
illustrates the magnitude of the long-term incentives as a percentage of total CEO 
compensation:
Table 5: NED CEO LTI and compensation review
mmdccli2012 mmdcclii2011 mmdccliii2010
mmdcclivGuaranteed remuneration mmdcclv6 247 000 mmdcclvi5 983 000 mmdcclvii5 459 000
mmdcclviiiLTI mmdcclix16 250 000 mmdcclx10 500 000 mmdcclxi6 000 000
mmdcclxiiSTI mmdcclxiii6 250 000 mmdcclxiv9 700 000 mmdcclxv7 000 000
mmdcclxviTotal mmdcclxvii28 747 000 mmdcclxviii26 183 000 mmdcclxix18 459 000
mmdcclxxLTI as % of package mmdcclxxi57% mmdcclxxii40% mmdcclxxiii33%
mmdcclxxivSTI target measures (as % of guaranteed pay) mmdcclxxv182% mmdcclxxvi162% mmdcclxxvii122%
mmdcclxxviiiBenchmark as reference for STI (on-target to 
maximum) mmdcclxxix150–250% mmdcclxxx150–250% mmdcclxxxi150–250%
Note: LTI: long-term incentive; STI: short-term incentive
1Source: Nedbank (2011, 2012, 2012)
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Key company performance measures include return on equity (RoE) (as a sliding 
scale relative to cost-of-equity outperformance); and the performance of company 
share price relative to the FINI15. Not only did the company not outperform the 
JSE Banks Index (which is not the FINI15), but it also failed to outperform the JSE 
ALSI. While performing up to 15% poorer than its peers, it still qualifies the CEO 
for 25% of a possible 150% for that element which is questionable. The substantial 
absolute value of the long-term incentives remains subject to further questioning, 
and no details are provided about overall value benchmarks or increase measures.
Given the analysis and graphical illustration of CEO compensation relative to other 
measures, the justification for the upward spiralling growth in CEO compensation is 
unconvincing and could be deemed excessive.
Standard Bank (SBK)


















































































































mmdccxcvi1 mmdccxcvii.73* mmdccxcviii.03 mmdccxcix.69* mmdccc.02 mmdccci.03 mmdcccii.36 mmdccciii-.07 mmdccciv.34 mmdcccv.58 mmdcccvi.26 mmdcccvii.32
mmdcccviiiSig
mmdcccix(1-tailed)
mmdcccx.03* mmdcccxi.48 mmdcccxii.04* mmdcccxiii.48 mmdcccxiv.47 mmdcccxv.21 mmdcccxvi.45 mmdcccxvii.23 mmdcccxviii.09 mmdcccxix.29 mmdcccxx.24
mmdcccxxiN mmdcccxxii7 mmdcccxxiii7* mmdcccxxiv7 mmdcccxxv7* mmdcccxxvi7 mmdcccxxvii7 mmdcccxxviii7 mmdcccxxix7 mmdcccxxx7 mmdcccxxxi7 mmdcccxxxii7 mmdcccxxxiii7
mmdcccxxxiv* Significant at 0.05 level.
Source: McGregor BFA
1In Table 6, a significant positive correlation at the five per cent level is present 
between CEO compensation and one of the company accounting performance 
measures, namely HEPS. No significant correlation is present between CEO 
compensation and the company market performance measure or any other factors 
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such as the CEO pay multiple, the number of employees, total assets and average 
salary per employee. External variables, such as the CPI and JSE ALSI, also do not 
correlate with CEO compensation.
The CEO received no bonus because of poor underlying performance during 
2010. During 2011, the company’s long-time CEO retired and a re-pricing occurred 
with the appointment of a new joint-CEO. All things considered, the CEO 
compensation was sensitive to the company’s relatively poor performance, and did 
not appear excessive. The fact that CEO compensation is sensitive to periods of 
relatively substandard performance is a fitting example of fair compensation relative 
to company performance.
Part B:  Hypothesis testing: the relationship between CEO compensation 
and the JSE Banking Sector
Main hypothesis
Step 1: Correlation analysis













mmdcccxli.698* mmdcccxlii.698* mmdcccxliii-.227 mmdcccxliv-.162
mmdcccxlvSig (1-tailed) mmdcccxlvi.040* mmdcccxlvii.040* mmdcccxlviii.313 mmdcccxlix.364
mmdcccl* Significant at 0.05 level.
mmdcccliNote:  For consistency, the JSE Banking Sector market capitalisation instead of share price (the variable 
at individual company level) was used. The sector market capitalisation compared with the share 
price result differed by less than one per cent, and the difference is considered immaterial.
Source: McGregor BFA
1In Table 7, a significant correlation at the five per cent level is present between 
CEO compensation, a JSE Banking Sector accounting performance measure, 
namely HEPS, and the JSE Banking Sector market performance measure, market 
capitalisation. The study therefore found that in the banking industry, on average, 
CEO compensation packages do correspond with company performance measures 
in the long run. The finding is highly significant, as the period under review 
included an economic recession.
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Given the fact that averages may conceal detailed underlying trends, Table 8 
presents the correlations between company performance and CEO compensation.
Table 8: Correlations between company performance and CEO compensation













mmdccclxBGA mmdccclxiNo mmdccclxiiNo mmdccclxiiiNo mmdccclxivNo mmdccclxvNo** mmdccclxviLikely**
mmdccclxviiCPT mmdccclxviiiYes mmdccclxixYes mmdccclxxYes mmdccclxxiNo mmdccclxxiiN/A mmdccclxxiiiNot likely
mmdccclxxivFSR mmdccclxxvYes mmdccclxxviNo mmdccclxxviiYes mmdccclxxviiiNo mmdccclxxixN/A mmdccclxxxNot likely
mmdccclxxxiNED mmdccclxxxiiYes mmdccclxxxiiiNo mmdccclxxxivNo mmdccclxxxvNo mmdccclxxxviNo*** mmdccclxxxviiLikely***
mmdccclxxxviiiSBK mmdccclxxxixNo mmdcccxcNo mmdcccxciYes mmdcccxciiNo mmdcccxciiiN/A mmdcccxcivNot likely
mmdcccxcvJSE BANKS mmdcccxcviYes (0.4) mmdcccxcviiNo mmdcccxcviiiYes (0.4) mmdcccxcixNo mmcmN/A mmcmiNot likely
mmcmii *  Only considered where no clear correlation existed between company accounting and/or market 
performance and CEO compensation; alternatively the field was marked as “not applicable” 
(N/A).
mmcmiii ** Refer to the analysis presented under Barclays Group Africa’s correlation analysis.
mmcmiv*** Refer to the analysis presented under Nedbank’s correlation analysis.
Step 2: Conclusion on main hypothesis
1Company market performance (share price) exhibited a p-value of 0.04, while at least 
one company accounting performance measure (HEPS) also exhibited a p-value of 
0.04. In addition, for each of these variables, three out of the five companies in the 
population individually exhibited a significant positive correlation. We therefore 
found support for the hypothesis.
Subhypothesis 1
Step 1: Correlation analysis
Table 9: Subhypothesis 1 correlation analysis
mmcmvJSE Banks average salary per 
employee
mmcmviJSE Banks CEO 
pay multiple
mmcmviiJSE Banks CEO salary mmcmviiiPearson correlation mmcmix.824* mmcmx.556
mmcmxiSig (1-tailed) mmcmxii.011* mmcmxiii.097
mmcmxiv* Significant at 0.05 level.
Source: McGregor BFA
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1In Table 9, a significant correlation is present at the five per cent level between CEO 
compensation and average employee salary in the JSE Banking Sector. However, 
the correlation between CEO compensation and the CEO pay multiple is not 
statistically significant.
Table 10 summarises the findings at company level.
Table 10: Subhypothesis 1 variables correlation summary
mmcmxvIndependent variables – significant correlation present?
mmcmxviCEO package (dependent 
variable)






mmcmxxxivJSE BANKS mmcmxxxvYes mmcmxxxviNo
Step 2: Conclusion on subhypothesis 1
1The average employee salary exhibited a p-value of 0.011, while the number of 
employees exhibited a p-value of 0.097. Therefore, we found support for the 
hypothesis that a positive long-term relationship exists between CEO compensation 
and average employee salary.
Subhypothesis 2
Step 1: Correlation analysis
Table 11: Subhypothesis 2 correlation analysis
mmcmxxxviiJSE Banks total 
assets
mmcmxxxviiiJSE Banks no. of 
employees
mmcmxxxixJSE Banks CEO salary mmcmxlPearson correlation mmcmxli.479 mmcmxlii-.087
mmcmxliiiSig (1-tailed) mmcmxliv.139 mmcmxlv.426
mmcmxlvi*NSignificant at 0.05 level
Source: McGregor BFA
1In Table 11, no significant correlation is present at the five per cent level between 
CEO compensation and the JSE Banking Sector.
Table 12 summarises the findings at company level.
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Table 12: Subhypothesis 2 variables correlation summary
mmcmxlviiIndependent variables – significant correlation 
present?
mmcmxlviiiCEO package (dependent 
variable)
mmcmxlixTotal assets mmcmlNumber of employees
mmcmliBGA mmcmliiNo mmcmliiiNo
mmcmlivCPT mmcmlvYes mmcmlviNo
mmcmlviiFSR mmcmlviiiNo mmcmlixYes (Negative)
mmcmlxNED mmcmlxiYes mmcmlxiiYes
mmcmlxiiiSBK mmcmlxivNo mmcmlxvNo
mmcmlxviJSE BANKS mmcmlxviiNo mmcmlxviiiNo
Step 2: Conclusion on subhypothesis 2
1The relationship between CEO compensation and total assets exhibited a p-value 
of 0.139, while CEO compensation and number of employees exhibited a p-value 
of 0.426. None of the variables represent a significant positive correlation at the five 
per cent level. Based on the findings, although a moderately strong relationship is 
present, there is no significant positive relationship and the hypothesis was therefore 
rejected.
Subhypothesis 3
Step 1: Correlation analysis
1The sector figure cannot be compared to itself, therefore only Table 13, which 
summarises the findings at company level, is analysed in order to reach a conclusion.
Table 13: Subhypothesis 3 variables correlation summary
mmcmlxixIndependent variables – significant correlation 
present?
mmcmlxxCEO compensation (dependent 
variable)
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Step 2: Conclusion on subhypothesis 3
1Table 13 illustrates that four of the five companies in the population exhibited a 
significant long-term positive correlation between CEO compensation and the 
compensation of their peers. Therefore, more than 80% of the population’s CEO 
compensation closely matched that of other CEOs. This is a strong indicator of 
the influence of averaging CEO packages. We therefore found support for the 
hypothesis.
Subhypothesis 4
Step 1: Correlation analysis
Table 14: Subhypothesis 4
1JSE ALSI
1JSE Banks CEO salary 1Pearson correlation 1.746*
1Sig (1-tailed) 1.027
1* Significant at 0.05 level.
Source: McGregor BFA
1In Table 14, a significant correlation is present at the five per cent level between 
CEO compensation and the JSE ALSI.
Table 15 summarises the findings at company level.
Table 15: Hypothesis 5 variables correlation summary
mmcmlxxxivIndependent variables – significant correlation 
present?









Step 2: Conclusion on subhypothesis 4
1The correlation between CEO compensation and the JSE ALSI exhibited a 
p-value of 0.027, which is indicative of a statistically significant positive long-term 
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relationship between CEO compensation and the JSE ALSI. Only two of the five 
companies’ individual CEO compensations correlated at the five per cent level with 
the JSE ALSI, yet the two companies were very closely correlated with p-values of 
0.008 (FSR) and 0.004 (NED). CPT fell only slightly outside the cut-off at 0.055. 
Given the low probability at a sector level and the overall low p-values for three of 
the five companies, we found support for the hypothesis.
Subhypothesis 5
Step 1: Correlation analysis
Table 16: Correlation analysis for subhypothesis 5
mmcmxcixCPI inflation
mmmJSE Banks CEO salary mmmiPearson correlation mmmii.707*
mmmiiiSig (1-tailed) mmmiv.038
mmmv* Significant at 0.05 level.
Source: McGregor BFA
1In Table 16, a significant correlation is present at the five per cent level between 
CEO compensation and general inflation.
Table 17 summarises the findings at company level.
Table 17: Subhypothesis 5 variables correlation summary
mmmviIndependent variables – significant correlation 
present?







Step 2: Conclusion on subhypothesis 5
1The relationship between CEO compensation and general inflation exhibited a 
p-value of 0.038, which is indicative of a statistically significant positive long-term 
relationship between CEO compensation and the JSE ALSI. Only one of the five 
companies’ individual CEO compensations correlated at the five per cent level with 
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general inflation. An analysis of the p-values indicated that NED closely correlated 
with a p-value of 0.002 (NED), while CPT at 0.096 and FSR at 0.059 fell only slightly 
outside the cut-off. Given the low probability at a sector level and low individual 
p-values for those outside the cut-off, we found support for the hypothesis.
Summary of hypotheses findings
1Table 18 summarises the findings related to the goals of the research study.
Table 18: Summary of hypotheses findings





mmmxxvCompany performance mmmxxviA positive long-term relationship exists between CEO 




mmmxxixA positive long-term relationship exists between CEO 
compensation and average employee salaries.
mmmxxxAccepted
mmmxxxiCompany size mmmxxxiiA positive long-term relationship exists between CEO 
compensation and company size.
mmmxxxiiiRejected
mmmxxxivBank CEO peers mmmxxxvA positive long-term relationship exists between company 
CEO compensation and the compensation of his/her peers.
mmmxxxviAccepted
mmmxxxviiJSE ALSI performance mmmxxxviiiA positive long-term relationship exists between CEO 
compensation and JSE market performance.
mmmxxxixAccepted
mmmxlGeneral inflation mmmxliA positive long-term relationship exists between CEO 
compensation and general inflation.
mmmxliiAccepted
Key findings
1The key findings of the study are discussed in this section.
Overall, there is a statistically significant positive long-term correlation between 
the JSE Banking Sector market performance and CEO compensation, although not 
all banks included in the population exhibit this correlation. In one instance, the CEO 
compensation reflected a strong sensitivity to poor company performance, which is 
indicative of certain REMCOs being judicious in linking variable compensation to 
company performance. The measure remained consistent throughout the reporting 
period, which made consistent and fair judgement of performance possible.
Two companies showed plausible CEO overcompensation when compared to both 
company performance and CEO compensation packages of peers. In both instances, 
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CEO compensation significantly exceeded company performance measured over a 
seven-year period. A qualitative analysis was performed to determine the underlying 
motivation for compensation, and some justification was provided. However, the 
absolute levels of compensation remain contentious. Although detailed justification 
is provided for short-term incentives, peer pressure or the law of averages appears to 
inflate CEO compensation annually. The literature review revealed that it is common 
practice for companies to link excessive CEO compensation to company size. This 
study found no significant long-term correlation between CEO performance and 
company size at a sector level, yet in one instance where the CEO compensation 
was considered contentious, size was closely correlated. Overall, employees in the 
banking sector are well remunerated, which is corroborated by the finding that 
there is a positive long-term relationship between CEO compensation and average 
employee salary. Figure 5 illustrates this correlation. There is less correlation between 
average employee salary and company performance in periods of poor performance. 
This indicates that a relatively insignificant portion of an average employee’s salary 
comprises variable remuneration, in comparison with a CEO’s compensation, which 
includes a substantial variable portion.
1
Source: McGregor BFA and own calculations
Figure 5: CEO compensation compared with average employee salary
1The CEO pay multiple is related to the Gini coefficient, as it embodies the difference 
between high-income earners, in this instance CEOs, and the average employee. 
Figure 6 illustrates that employees have consistently received increases in excess of 
inflation, which is indicative of sound human resource practices.
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1
Source: McGregor BFA and own calculations
Figure 6: Employee welfare and inflation
1Deeper investigation of correlative salary increases (of CEOs and employees) would 
inform future business discussions of organised labour and the issue of minimum 
wages, which fell beyond the scope of this study.
Based on the findings of the data analysis, the goals of the research study were 
achieved, thereby contributing meaningfully to the study of the relationship between 
CEO compensation and company performance.
Further research
1This research paper focuses on the JSE’s Banking Sector. Future research could focus 
on other sectors of the JSE and other logically grouped companies. Future studies 
may also focus on a specific sector in other countries. IFRS 2 has been effective 
for more than nine years, but the detailed disclosure of directors’ remuneration is 
still gradually improving each year. King III has added to improved disclosure, and 
continued future developments in IFRS will aid future studies. In some instances, 
the research revealed that the actual value of share options, at grant date, is not 
well disclosed; with improved disclosure, further detailed analysis of performance-
based remuneration would be possible. This includes a long-term review of the link 
between actual realised equity compensation and potential equity compensation 
as approved at the time of the equity compensation award. With employee strikes 
being an on-going phenomenon in South Africa, further studies on the CEO pay 
multiple – relative to both average employee salary and minimum wage – will add 
quantifiable data to the annual discussions between organised labour and business. 
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With ever-increasing corporate governance requirements, the quality of company 
remuneration policies is likely to improve. Refined monitoring, reporting and 
disclosure will further help guide executive remuneration, and may even culminate 
in the creation of a predictive model to forecast executive remuneration. Research 
into a likely remuneration predictor is possible. As disclosure improves, stakeholders’ 
abilities to critically analyse the information presented to them by the company’s 
annual financial statements will also be enhanced.
Conclusion
1This study provides an original contribution with regard to the link between South 
African CEO compensation and company performance in the banking industry. 
This will be of particular interest to investors and other stakeholders, such as unions 
and regulators, who expect CEOs to be compensated based on aligned interests 
relating to company performance. The findings are consistent with the principles of 
the agency theory.
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